Sequestration at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): Air Traffic Controller Furloughs and Congressional Response

Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Policy

Clinton T. Brass
Specialist in Government Organization and Management

Robert S. Kirk
Specialist in Transportation Policy

In response to across-the-board funding reductions in federal programs through the budget sequestration process implemented in FY2013, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began to furlough personnel, including air traffic controllers, on April 21, 2013. In conjunction with air traffic controller furloughs, FAA implemented various air traffic management initiatives to mitigate impacts of the reduced staffing on controller workload. This resulted in some delays affecting about 3%-4% of flights, with some acute delay impacts occurring in congested airspace, particularly in the New York City area.

Amid concerns over the impacts of air traffic controller furloughs, Congress passed the Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-9). The act authorized FAA to transfer up to $253 million from funding available for airport grants or other FAA programs and accounts to the FAA operations account for necessary costs to prevent reduced operations and staffing and ensure a safe and efficient air transportation system. Following passage of this legislation in Congress, FAA suspended all employee furloughs and resumed air traffic control operations under normal procedures and full staffing levels.

Prior to the April 2013 furloughs, FAA furloughed employees in the summer of 2011. However, the FAA furlough actions associated with sequestration had a different legal basis and were consequently implemented quite differently. The summer 2011 furloughs arose as a result of a lapse in authority to collect Airport and Airways Trust Fund (AATF) revenues, the sole funding source for FAA’s facilities and equipment (F&E) account, the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), and research, engineering, and development activities. Expenditure authority for AIP also expired in the summer of 2011. The expiration of these authorities resulted in immediate furloughs for most employees funded from these accounts. Some employees funded through the F&E account responsible for ensuring the safety and reliability of navigation and communications equipment were ordered to stay on the job. Employees paid through FAA’s operations account, including air traffic controllers, were not furloughed in 2011.

Certain AIP grants-in-aid funds for airport development and planning are now subject to provisions of the Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013. It appears that the transfer of the designated AIP discretionary funds to air traffic operations reduces the amount made available to airports under 49 U.S.C. 48103. This has implications for both the eventual spending of AIP discretionary funds and the calculation of the amount of AIP entitlement funding available for distribution.

• Unless Congress takes further action, the transferred funds will eventually lead to real reductions in AIP discretionary spending. 
• FAA may need to stop or reduce its AIP discretionary grant making for the remainder of FY2013 to comply with the act. 
• Individual airports’ formula “entitlements” could be reduced for the remainder of the fiscal year if FAA transfers most or all of the $253 million allowed under the act.

Date of Report: May 7, 2013
Number of Pages: 13
Order Number: R43065
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Ensuring That Traffic Signs Are Visible at Night: Federal Regulations

David Randall Peterman
Analyst in Transportation Policy

Traffic signs provide information to help motorists travel safely. If a sign is useful during daytime, it has equal or greater value to motorists at night, when less of the road environment can be seen. Federal regulations have long required that traffic signs be visible at night, either through the use of retroreflective materials (materials that reflect light, such as from headlights, back in the direction from which it came) or through permanent lighting illuminating the sign. These regulations are part of the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), a compilation of federal regulations governing traffic control devices. Due to the costs and practical limitations on supplying electricity for lighting, agencies typically rely on retroreflective materials to make most traffic signs visible at night.

Retroreflective materials lose their reflective properties over time due to weathering and other factors. This reduces the visibility of the signs at night. To promote safety, the MUTCD also requires agencies to monitor their traffic control devices and make sure they comply with the federal requirements. Thus, agencies have been required to make sure that their traffic signs are visible at night, and to replace those which are no longer visible. However, for many years there was no objective standard establishing what level of retroreflectivity was needed for a traffic sign to be visible at night.

In 1992, Congress directed the federal Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop a standard for the minimum level of retroreflectivity that traffic signs (and pavement markings) must maintain. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) within DOT had already been doing research on the reflective properties of sign materials. Between 1993 and 2004 FHWA did further research and consulted with state and local transportation agencies regarding the implementation of the congressional directive. Between 2004 and 2007, FHWA completed a rulemaking to add a minimum standard for the retroreflectivity of traffic signs to the MUTCD. The new standard had three elements: it set a minimum measurable value for the retroreflectivity of traffic signs to ensure their visibility at night; it required state and local agencies to adopt a method by which to maintain the nighttime visibility of their traffic signs by 2012; and it required agencies to ensure that their signs were in compliance with the standard by 2018.

In 2009, the street sign lettering standard in the MUTCD was revised. This standard did not have a compliance deadline. In 2010, several press reports conflated the new nighttime visibility standard with the new street sign lettering standard. These articles made it appear that the federal government was requiring communities to replace traffic signs just to change their lettering style. Communities also complained about the cost of the new nighttime visibility maintenance standard (though the requirement that they replace traffic signs that were no longer visible at night was not new). Thus the nighttime visibility maintenance standard came to the attention of Congress.

In 2012, FHWA amended the compliance dates for the retroreflectivity standard (and several other MUTCD standards) to alleviate possible financial burdens the deadlines might have created for state and local highway agencies.


Date of Report: April 16, 2013
Number of Pages: 10
Order Number: R43042
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Algae’s Potential as a Transportation Biofuel

Kelsi Bracmort
Specialist in Agricultural Conservation and Natural Resources Policy

Congress continues to debate the federal role in biofuel research, biofuel tax incentives, and renewable fuel mandates. The debate touches on topics such as fuel imports and security, job creation, and environmental benefits, and is particularly significant for advanced biofuels, such as those produced by algae.

Congress established the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2)—a mandate requiring that the national fuel supply contain a minimum amount of fuel produced from renewable biomass. The RFS2 is essentially composed of two biofuel mandates—one for unspecified biofuel, which is being met with corn-starch ethanol, and one for advanced biofuels (or non-corn starch ethanol), which may not be met in coming years. Within the advanced biofuels category, the RFS2 requirements for the cellulosic biofuels subcategory (e.g., ethanol from switchgrass) have not been met for the last few years, which could cause alarm, as this subcategory is slated to ramp up from roughly 3% of the standard in 2012 to roughly 44% of the standard in 2022. Limited cellulosic biofuels production has occurred to date. As a result, as allowed under the RFS2, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has lowered the required cellulosic biofuels volume for 2010, 2011, and 2012 and has proposed to do the same for 2013.

Currently, algae-based biofuel qualifies as an advanced biofuel under the RFS2, but not as a cellulosic biofuel. One possible solution to meet the RFS2 cellulosic biofuels mandate is to add algae as an eligible feedstock type. Because algae is not cellulosic and is not defined as such in the RFS2, it does not qualify for this subcategory. Algae does qualify as a feedstock for the biomass-based diesel subcategory of the RFS2 advanced biofuel mandate. The RFS2 does not mandate rapid growth of biomass-based diesel, as it does for cellulosic biofuels.

Algae can be converted into various types of energy for transportation, including biodiesel, jet fuel, electric power, and ethanol. The potential advantages of algae-based biofuel over other biofuel pathways include higher biomass yields per acre of cultivation, little to no competition for arable land, use of a wide variety of water sources, the opportunity to reuse carbon dioxide from stationary sources, and the potential to produce “drop-in” ready-to-use fuels. Potential drawbacks include the anticipated cost of production, the amount of resources (e.g., water and land) required to produce the biofuel, and the lack of commercial-scale production facilities. Algae-based biofuel research and development are in their infancy, although work has been conducted in this area for decades. At present, published research efforts offer policymakers little guidance on what algae types or conversion methods for which biofuel could be the front-runner for commercial production, and when.

Congressional support for algae-based biofuel has consisted of congressionally directed projects and funding of programs and studies by the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD). Some algae industry advocates contend that Congress should encourage advances in algae-based biofuel production by extending the expiration date for eligible tax credits, appropriating additional federal funds for algae-related programs, and modifying the RFS2 to include algae in the cellulosic biofuels mandate, as was done recently for the cellulosic biofuels production tax credit. In contrast, some argue that Congress should reconsider its investment in biofuels because of the current federal budget crisis and the lack of any measurable progress in cellulosic biofuels production.


Date of Report: April 1, 2013
Number of Pages: 19
Order Number: R42122
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Battery Manufacturing for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles: Policy Issues

Bill Canis
Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business

The United States is one of several countries encouraging production and sales of fully electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles to reduce oil consumption, air pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) provided federal financial support to develop a domestic lithium-ion battery supply chain for electric vehicles. Some of these companies have brought on new production capacity, but others have gone bankrupt or idled their plants. While early in his Administration President Obama forecast that 1 million plug-in electric vehicles would be sold by 2015, motorists have been slow to embrace all-electric vehicles. At the beginning of 2013, about 80,000 plug-in electrics were on U.S. roads.

In making a national commitment to building electric vehicles and most of their components in the United States, the federal government has invested $2.4 billion in electric battery production facilities and nearly $80 million a year for electric battery research and development. To increase sales of such vehicles, the President has recommended that the current $7,500 tax credit for purchase of a plug-in hybrid be converted into a $10,000 rebate, available at point of sale to car buyers upon purchase of a vehicle.

Developing affordable batteries offering long driving range is the biggest challenge to increasing sales of plug-in electric vehicles. Batteries for these vehicles differ substantially from traditional lead-acid batteries used in internal combustion engine vehicles: they are larger, heavier, more expensive, and have safety considerations that mandate use of electronically controlled cooling systems. Various chemistries can be applied, with lithium-ion appearing the most feasible approach at the present time.

The lithium-ion battery supply chain, expanded by ARRA investments, includes companies that mine and refine lithium; produce components, chemicals, and electronics; and assemble these components into battery cells and then into battery packs. Auto manufacturers design their vehicles to work with specific batteries, and provide proprietary cooling and other technologies before placing batteries in vehicles. Most of these operations are highly automated and require great precision. It has been estimated that 70% of the value added in making lithium-ion batteries is in making the cells, compared with only 15% in battery assembly and 10% in electrical and mechanical components.

Despite these supply chain investments, it will be difficult to achieve the goal of 1 million plug-in electric vehicles on U.S. roads by 2015. Costs remain high; although data are confidential, batteries alone are estimated to cost $8,000 to $18,000 per vehicle. Vehicle range limitations and charging issues have so far slowed expected purchases. Lower gasoline prices and improvements in competing internal combustion engine technologies could slow acceptance of electric vehicles, whereas persistent high gasoline prices could favor it. Advanced battery manufacturing is still an infant industry whose technology and potential market remain highly uncertain. Its development in the United States is likely to depend heavily on foreign competition and how the federal government further addresses the challenges of building a battery supply chain and promoting advances in battery technologies. .


Date of Report: April 4, 2013
Number of Pages: 34
Order Number: R41709
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Federal Traffic Safety Programs: An Overview

David Randall Peterman
Analyst in Transportation Policy

Driving is one of the riskiest activities the average American engages in. Deaths and serious injuries resulting from motor vehicle crashes are one of the leading causes of preventable deaths. In 2011, 32,367 people were killed in police-reported motor vehicle crashes, and an estimated 2.22 million people were injured.1 Most of the people who die in traffic crashes are relatively young and otherwise healthy. As a result, traffic crashes rank third overall, after cancer and diseases of the heart, in years of life lost (that is, the difference between the age at death and life expectancy).2 

In addition to the emotional toll exacted by these deaths and injuries, traffic crashes impose a significant economic toll. The Department of Transportation (DOT) estimated that the annual cost of motor vehicle crashes in 2000 was $231 billion.3 About one-third of the total cost came from the lost productivity of those killed and injured; about one-quarter from property damage; 15% from present and future medical costs; 11% from time lost due to congestion caused by crashes; and the remainder from the costs of insurance administration, legal services, workplace costs,4 and emergency services. While the number of traffic deaths has declined significantly since 2000, the estimated cost of crashes (adjusted for inflation) has remained within a comparable range, indicating an increase in the cost of each crash; estimates of the cost of traffic crashes in 2009 range from around $245 billion to $300 billion.


Date of Report: April 1, 2013
Number of Pages: 9
Order Number: R43026
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